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code which permits the assignment of choses in action (Voorhies'
N. Y. Code p. 76), appears to recognise fully the capacity of all
the covenants, indiscriminately, to run with the land.
Most of the courts which have felt restrained from adopting the
English rule would perhaps be prepared to entertain a suit in the
name of the original covenantor, for the benefit of the injured
party. 8 Humphreys 654; 10 Mo. 467 ; 19 Id. 71; 3 Met. 467;
8 Grattan 407. This method, though circuitous and often inadequate, may undoubtedly prevent many instances of hardship. In
actions of this kind on the covenant against incumbrances, some
difficulty may arise as to the proper form of the pleadings. Rawle
on Covs. 378.
But the only natural and satisfactory view seems to be to regard
the covenants for title as a single system for the protection of
the title to land, so long as their protection can legitimately be
required; and each- individual covenant as a special safeguard
against certain particular ways in which the integrity of the title
may be attacked. Upon this view, all of the covenants for title
ought manifestly to run with the land.
T. A. H.
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In proceedings by mandamus, it is not indispensable that the petition should state
that the relator is without any other adequate and sufficient remedy. If that
appear to the Court to be the fact, the alternative writ will not be quashed.
The House of Representatives, in a State Legislature, have no such jurisdiction
over the counting of the votes for members as will oust the jurisdiction of the
common law Courts in proceedings by mandamus against the canvassers. The
member elected has a right to receive the certificate of election, and if it is
refused him, and given to another, he may call upon the Courts for redress, by,
mandamus.
Tts sole purpose is to procure the requisite evidence to present to the House of a
primafacieright to a seat in it, independent wholly of the question of qualifica-
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tion. And the only means by which this can be obtained is by the compulsory
writ of viandamus.
This is not the case where one person desires to be placed in an office now filled by
another, for in such cases inandamus will not lie, It is more analogous to a
demand for the books and papers belonging to an office, or for the insignia of
office, for which this is the proper remedy.
The office of canvassers is merely ministerial, and as such will be controlled by the
Court under this process. They are required by statute to count all the votes
fbrmally certified to them. And the fact that some of the judges of elections
do not appear to have been properly sworn, is no objection to the validity of
their returns. The certificate of an officer defacto is all that is required.
And if any informality had really occurred, it might have been corrected before thd
canvassers, and should not have been allowed to operate to disfranchise the
voters.

Petition for mandamus. The facts of the case are stated in the
opinion of the Court.
TV. C. Goudy and the relator in person, for the relator.
U. F. Linder, J. L: Zing, and Davis, for the defendants.
J.-The petition in this case sets forth and shows that
at an election held on the 4th day of November, 1862, for members
of the General Assembly, and other officers, in the county of Cook,
the relator, with others, was a candidate for representative in the
sixtieth representative district, and was eligible to the office; that,
at the election, thirty-four hundred and twenty-nine votes were cast
for the relator, thirty-four hundred and twelve votes were cast for
George H. Gage, thirty-three hundred and eighty-five votes were
cast for Michael Brand, and thirty-three hundred and seventy-seven
votes for John Lyle King, as shown by the poll-books, and by the
certificates returned by the judges and inspectors of the election to
the office of the clerk of the County Court of Cook county, provided
all the votes shown by the poll-books and certificates to have been
cast for these candidates should be counted. It further shows,
after all the returns from the.different towns, precincts, and wards
in the county of Cook had been received by the clerk, on the 8th
day of November, 1862, the clerk, L. P. Hilliard, called to his
assistance J. B. Bradwell and L. H. Davis, two justices of the peace
of the county, and proceeded to open the returns and make abstracts
BREESE,
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of the votes cast for the different officers voted for at that election,
and, in the performance of this duty, the clerk, with the assistance
of these justices of the peace, opened the returns of the second
precinct of the fourth ward in the city of Chicago, a legally established voting precinct in the sixtieth representative district, which
was found in all respects to be in compliance with the statute of
this State, except that the affidavits of two of the judges, and of the
two clerks who acted in the precinct and made the returns, and
which were prefixed to the poll-books, did not have the signature
of the officers who administered the oaths attached to the several
jurats; that one of the judges, John Leib, had been duly sworn
before the clerk of the County Court, and his affidavit was in all
respects regular; that Leib appeared before the board of canvassers,
and offered to prove that the other judges and the clerks had been
duly sworn by him after he had been sworn, and before they
entered on the performance of their duties, and asked leave to put
his name to the jurats, but the majority of the board refused to
allow the proof to be made, or to permit Leib to sign his name to
the several jurats, and refused to count the votes so shown by the
poll-books and returns to have been cast in that precinct, for the
only reason that the several jurats did not have the signature of
the officer who administered the oath to the judges and clerks.
It shows that the returns from this precinct foot uip one hundred
and eighty-one votes for relator, and the same number for Brand,
And fifty-nine votes each for Gage and King, for representatives,
and that the rejection of these votes will deprive the relator of a
certificate of election, and award it to King. The relator states be
was present before the board when these returns were canvassed,
and insisted that the votes appearing therein as-having been cast
should be counted and entered in the abstract, which was refused
by the majority of the board. That if the votes of that precinct
are received and counted, he will be entitled to a certificate of
election, and he has demanded of the county clerk such certificate,
which he refuses to grant, because of the rejection of these returns,
and for no other reason, the effect of which will be to give to King
a greater number of votes. The prayer of the petition is for an
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alternative writ of mandamus against the clerk and the two justices
of the peace, to show cause why a peremptory mandamus should.
not be awarded requiring them to count the votes cast in this precinct, and enter the votes so cast in the abstracts of votes, and
against the clerk, requiring him to show cause why such writ should
not issue to compel him to certify the election of the relator as a
representative in the General Assembly for the sixtieth representative district.
To this alternative writ the clerk, Billiard, returns on oath that
he did, as clerk of the County Court of Cook county, on the day
stated in the petition, call to his assistance Bradwell and Davis,
justices of the peace of Cook county, and proceeded to canvass the
votes as stated in the petition, and made abstracts of the votes, as
shown by the relator, except that the affidavit of Leib was not
offered to the board until a majority of the board had decided to
throw out this poll-book, and, having canvassed all the returns presented to the board, thereupon the board dissolved; and he further
states, that, on the 10th day of November, John Lyle King demanded a certificate of his election, which, as clerk, he made out
and signed, and affixed the seal of his office thereto, and delivered
it to said King, it bearing date November 10th, 1862, which is the
true date.
Davis, on his oath, states in his return that he was called on to
aid in canvassing the votes as alleged in the petition; that he met
with the clerk and Bradwell, and proceeded to canvass the returns;
that when the pretended poll-book of the second precinct of the
fourth ward was presented, Bradwell looked at it, examined it, and
pronounced it irregular and informal, and suggested to affiant that
it must be thrown out, to which affiant agreed, and, the clerk concurring, the board decided to throw out that poll-book and returns,
that subsequently the attention of the board was called to this poll.
book, and arguments of counsel heard for and against throwing out
these returns, and the affidavit of Leib was offered to complete the
returns, and upon due consideration, and the exercise of sound discretion, the majority of the board decided to throw out this pollbook and return, and proceeded to canvass the remainder of the
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returns and declare the result. That on Monday morning, the
10th, he called at the clerk's office, and, after examining the returns as made out by the board, he signed them, and thereupon the
board was dissolved.
Bradwell, on oath, answers, admitting the statements in the petition to be true, and further says that at the time of counting the
votes he considered the action of the majority of the board of canvassers wrong, and entered his protest against it; that he was
always willing to have these votes counted. He further states
that no certificate of election had issued to King until after the
clerk was served with a notice by relator of this application for a
writ of mandamus.
The exhibits attached to the petition show the oath taken by
Leib, as one of the judges of the election, before the clerk of the
County Court, which is in the form prescribed by the statute, and
also the same form.of oath alleged to have been taken by the
other judges and clerks of the election, the jurats not being signed
by the judge who administered the oath.
On the coming in of these returns the defendants, Hilliard and
Davis, entered their motion to quash the alternative writ of mandamus for the reasons: First. Because the writ is returnable on the
14th of November, 1862, and the parties to be affected by it have
not had ten days' notice previous thereto, and have not the opportunity on this writ of contesting the same for want of time.
Second. Because the petition and writ do not show that the relator
is entitled to the relief sought, and the matters contained in the
writ are insufficient in law. Third. Because defendants are not
required by law to reassemble and count the votes in question.
Fourth. Because it does not appear that the relator has no other
pecific legal remedy. Fifth. For want of jurisdiction in this Court,
the House of Representatives alone having cognisance of the matter. Sixth. Because the return shows that the county clerk has,
prior to the issuing of the writ, issued a certificate of election in
eonformity with the vote declared; and because the petition and
writ are otherwise informal and defective.
Upon the first point the statute regulating this writ (Scute's
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Comp. 223) does not require a notice of ten days, or any other
specified number of days, but gives the Court power to allow such
convenient time to make return, plead, reply, rejoin, or demur, as
to the Court shall seem just and reasonable. By rule thirty-seven
of this Court, ten days' previous notice of the application is requisite, unless The Court, for special reasons, shall otherwise direct.
The longest time was allowed in this case which could be given
within the term of this Court, though no special reasons were
formally assigned for abridging the time. The fact that this Court
sits but a few days in the first grand division, is a sufficient reason
for dispensing with the notice of ten days. The term does not
usually consume one-half that time. A formal and full return
having been made to the alternati-Ae writ, affords conclusive evidence that the time allowed was ample.
The second ground is, in effect, a demurrer to the petition. No
causes of demurrer are set forth, and we cannot discover any. The
alternative writ stands as a declaration in an ordinary action, and
is sufficient if it contains all the facts necessary to call into action
the power of this Court. All material facts are fully set forth, so
that they may be admitted or traversed. They are by the demurrer
admitted to be true.
The only question is, what is the law on the admitted facts. The
third ground may possibly be well taken, but constitutes no bar to
the application. There is no necessity for reassembling the board
of canvassers, for the return does not deny that the relator is entitled to the certificate if the votes of this precinct are counted. It
is admitted they make up the majority of votes in favor of the
relator, so that nothing remains but for the clerk to issue the
certificate.
As to the fourth and fifth grounds of objection, the petition does
not allege, in terms, that the relator has no other specific legal
remedy, but, from the nature of the case, it is apparent he has
none. He seeks to obtain the evidence of his election as a representative in the General Assembly-to obtain a specific thing
which cannot be obtained through any other legal process. The
House of Representatives cannot give it to him, though that body
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may oust him, even when possessed of the certificate, for causes
dehors. His remedy does not lie in the power of the House in this
respect. It is preliminary to any action of that body, and over
which it has no power, or control, or jurisdiction. It is a demand.
upon a ministerial officer to perform a duty, enjoined by law, for
which all other legal process is wholly inadequate. The House of
Representatives has no cognisance whatever of this matter. That
body can only take cognisance of the case when the certificate is
presented, and a seat claimed in virtue of it.
Upon the remaining ground of objection, that the county clerk
had issued a certificate of election to another party, prior to the
issuing out of this writ, it is. only necessary to say that it is in
proof the certificate was not issued until after notice of this application for this writ. When the fact was brought home to the clerk
that this application was made, it would have been quite decorous
and proper to pause. in his action, and await the decision of the
Court; the more especially as by issuing the certificate to a party
not entitled, the right of the true claimant could not be weakened
thereby. The power remains to the clerk to issue the certificate
to the party this Court may deem entitled to it. The People, &c.,
vs. Rives, 27 Ill. 246. There are no other means known to the
law by which this result can be obtained. - Though the House of
Representatives is the sole and exclusive judge of the- qualifications
of its members, this application has no reference whatever to the
point of qualifications. Its sole purpose is to procure the requisite
evidence, to present to that body, of a primd facie right to a seat
in it, independent wholly of the question of qualification. It is
clear, then, the appropriate remedy is not with the House of Representatives. The only remedy the relator has-the only means by
which he can obtain evidence of the right claimed, is by this compulsory writ of mandamus. This is very clear. No other process
or proceeding can give the specific relief in the premises.
But it is urged that, as the certificate has already issued, the
office is filled, and therefore the only remedy is by a contest before
the House. Some cases are referred to in support of this position,
but it will be seen most of them were applications for a mandamus
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to admit to an office. This is not such a case. The relator asks
not to be admitted to an office, but that evidence of his having been
elected to an office shall be furnished him. It is not to turn one
man out and put the relator in office that this proceeding is had.
A mandamus will not lie for such purpose, and decision in this
case cannot affect the right of another claiming the office. That is
for the House of Representatives to determine. The People, ex
rel. Akin. et. al. vs. Matteson - Stame, 17 Ill. 169. In the case
of The People ex rel. Brewster & Jones vs. .Kilduff, 15 Id. 493,
this Court said that mandamus was the proper remedy against an
ex-mayor to obtain possession of the seal, books, &c., the property
of the corporation, by his successor, and this without involving
the inquiry into the right to the office. So in the case of The
People ex rel. Cummings vs. Hfead, 25 Id. 325, it was held that
a mandamus is an adequate remedy by which to compel an old
clerk to deliver the insignia of office to the new, but not to try and
determine the right of -either party to a permanent enjoyment of
the office.
In some of the States, this writ is not allowed for such purpose,
but frequent resort has been had to it in this State, resulting in
decisions quite uniform and harmonious, and which must be our
guide in preference to the rulings of Courts of other States, cited
by the defendants. We have noticed the fact, that the certificate
of election, issued by the clerk to King,. under which it is claimed
the office is filled, was, in fact, issued after notice of this application, and that when notice was served, the canvass had not actually
been completed.
But it is urged by the defendants, that the board of canvassers
had and exercised a judicial discretion in ruling out these returns;
and having acted in good faith, they cannot be compelled to act
against their deliberate judgment.
We have recognised a board of canvassers as ministerial, and
not judicial officers. In the case of .7ead, 25 Ill. 3265, it was there
said, The duty of a board of canvassers is a mere mechanical or
mathermatical duty. They may probably judge whether the returns
are in due form, but, after that, they can only compute the votes cast
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for the several candidates, and declare the result. This class of
power is not generally understood to be judicial, but purely ministerial. In .the case of The People ex rel. Bristol vs. Peemson,
Judge, &c., 2 Scam. 189, a mandamus was awarded to compel the
judge to sign a bill of exceptions presented to him by the relator,
though he had actually signed one bill, as appeared in the case.
This Court said that the act of signing and approving the bills, is
in its nature ministerial, though a legal discretion is in some
measure to be used in determining whether or not the bill should
be signed. In the' case of 1%e People ex rel. Ch.Burl, and Quincy
Railroad Co. vs. Wilson, 17 Id. 128, which was an application to
the defendant, as judge of the 18th judicial circuit, for the appointment of commissioners to appraise and condemn certain pieces of
land for the use of a railway, and which he had refused to appoint,
it was objected in this Court that the judge was acting in a judicial
capacity, and that,, having refused the application, a mandamus
would not lie to compel him to reverse his decision.
This Court said: "We cannot, by mandamus, control the judicial
action of any inferior tribunal. We can, in such a case, only set
it in motion, and require it to act one way or the other, but without determining how it shall act.. And so, too, when the inferior
tribunal is vested with a discretion in the performance of a duty
imposed by law. We can only compel the performance of the
duty, without controlling that discretion, or saying how the duty
shall be performed. Here the act to be performed by the circuit
judge is strictly of a ministerial character."
In Strong's Case, 20 Pickering 484, it is said.: "We are aware
that this is not a writ of right, but grantable at the discretion of
the Court, and will not be granted where there is any other adequate specific remedy. But we have no doubt that the present is
a proper case for the exercise of our discretion, and that to refuse
to grant the-writ would be doing palpable injustice to the petitioner,
and defeating the will of a majority of the voters of the county,
clearly manifested by their votes, duly and legally evidenced before
the proper tribunal. No other remedy can reach the evil."
These cases settle all the objections urged against the writ, and,
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by necessary implication, seem to determine that, where a party is
entitled to a specific thing, and there is no other specific remedy,
by which the very right claimed can be secured, he is entitled, ex
debito justitite, to demand it by mandamus. Bacon's Abridg. 418.
Now, as to the returns which were rejected by the board, were
they in conformity to the statute ? for on this hinges the whole
controversy.
Section 23 of ch. 37, title "Elections," provides, "When the
votes shall have been examined and counted, the clerks shall set
down in their poll-book the name of every person voted for, written
at full length, the office for which such person received such vote
or votes, and the number he did receive, the number being expressed
in words at full length; such entry to be made as nearly as circumstances will admit, in the following form." Scate's Comp. 468.
Section 25 of the same Act provides, that on the seventh day
after the close of the election, or sooner, if all the returns be received, the clerk of the' county court, taking to his assistance two
justices of the peace of his county, shall proceed to open the said
returns, and make abstracts of the votes, in the following manner,
&c. ; and it shall be the duty of the said clerk immediately to make
out a certificate of election to each of the persons having the highest number of'votes, for senator and representatives to the General
Assembly, and to county officers respectively, and to deliver such
certificate to the person entitled to it, on his making application
for that purpose to the clerk at his office. Id. 468.
These officers are clothed with no discretionary power. They are
to open " the said returns," and make abstracts of the votes as
they appear in said returns, and the clerk is to deliver a certificate
of election to each of the persons having the highest number of
votes, as manifested by "the said returns." They are not allowed
to reject any returns, or to decide upon their validity, if, on the
face, they are made in compliance with the law, and in the form
prescribed by the statute. If the returns show the whole number
of votes given, the names of the persons voted for, and the' number of votes given to each, they contain everything that is material,
and, if duly authenticated, should be received as valid returns.
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It is not denied these returns were duly authenticated, in the
mode prescribed by section twenty-three, above quoted. No objecton was made to the certificates of the judges and clerks. The
board was bound to go by their certificates, and to declare the
result, as shown by the certificates. The People, Jc. vs. Kilduff,
15 11. 492.
The objection that the entry of the oaths of the judges and clerks
of the election was not prefixed to the poll-books, as required by
section 13 of Ch. 37, is of no force, for such entry forms no part
of the certificate on which the board is to act. The certificate
itself was formal and regular.. But we think'it was wholly immaterial, so far as the validity of the return was concerned, whether
the officers of this election precinct, were sworn or not. They were
acting colore offieii in the performance of appropriate acts, and are
presumed to have been well appointed and qualified. In the case
of The People vs. Cook, 14 Barbour 259, it was said, if inspectors
of elections come into office by color of title, that is sufficient to
constitute them officers de facto; and if they are officers de facto,
their omission to take the oath prescribed by the statute, will not
invalidate an election held by them. This principle applies to all
officers. This Court has said in the case of The Town of Lewistown
vs. Proctor, 23 Ill. 533, if a person act as justice of the peace
or police magistrate, whether he was irregularly elected or for a
proper period, cannot be inquired into, collaterally-his decisions,
under color of office, will be enforced. To the same purport is the
case of Greenleaf vs. Low, 4 Denio 168.
It is sufficient then, for the purposes of this controversy, that
the judges and clerks of this election precinct, were acting under
color of office, having been duly appointed. It is not denied that
they were officers de facto, and their certificate of the returns of the
votes given in the precinct, being complete and full, and in strict
compliance with the statute, the board of canvassers bad no right
ti reject it. In rejecting it, they assumed a power dangerous to
the citizen, and fatal to the elective franchise. Whence .did the
board of canvassers derive the power to entertain and act on this
objection? It does not go to the character of the certificate, or to the
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authen,tication of the returns-all these were formal and correct,
and we have found no law, and recognise no principle, justifying
their act.
But if it was an objection which the board could entertain, it was
one which could be removed by a very simple act. The oaths of
the judges and clerks were filled out as prescribed by the statute,
U
and signed and sworn to by all of them, which is not denied. The
only defect was, the -officer who administered the oath to them,
neglected to put his name to the several jurats, nor is this denied.
And it farther appears, that during the canvass by the board, and
pending the consideration of this objection, the relator offered to
remove the difficulty by an amendment in accordance with the fact,
and for that purpose "produced one of the judges of the election,
Mr. Leib, who, the poll-book showed, had been duly sworn by the
county clerk, and offered to prove by him, that he had administered
the oath to the other judges and clerks, in the form required by
the statute, and which it appeared by the poll-book they had
severally signed. It was also proposed by the relator, that Leib
should be permitted to perfect the entry of the oaths, by then
signing the jurats, all of which was refused by the board.
We cannot but think this was a grievous error on the part of the
board. It was at most but a formal defect, and such defects are
always open to correction. In England, in the British House of
Commons, it was decided that a mistake in the Christian name of a
party returned as a member, and also a false return, might be
amended even at the bar of the house (Hammond's Treatise on
the Practice of Parliament 25); and there also, where the law
requires the clerks of elections to be sworn, it was held,.if they
were not sworn, the election was not void. Peckwill's Cases of
Contested Elections in Parliament 506. Here the poll-books contained true copies of the several affidavits or oaths taken, by the
officers of the election, and they were duly subscribed by themthe signature of the officer who administered the oath, was alone
wanting to the jurats, and though he offered and desired to supply
his own omission, it was refuse, and two hundred and forty citizens
thereby disfranchised.
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We cannot reconcile it to our ideas of right and justice, that the
voters of an entire precinct in an important and populous ward of
the city of Chicago, shall be disfranchised by the neglect of the
officer, who administered the oath of office to the judges and clerks
of the election, to certify the fact, nor can we reconcile, on any
principle, the refusal of the board to permit the jurats to be perfected. The amendment, if allowed, deprived no one of any right;
it altered nothing, and was in furtherance of justice.
The certificate and returns were full and complete. The oath
was no part of either. The plain duty of the board was to make
the abstract from the returns, and give the certificate to the person
who appeared by the returns to have received the highest vote. The
question in all such cases should be, whom did a majority of the
qualified voters elect ? Forms should be made subservient to this
inquiry, and should not rule in opposition to substance.
A literal compliance with prescribed forms is not required in any
case, if the spirit of the law is not violated; and in all cases the
intention of the voters clearly ascertained, should govern. Here
has been a strict compliance with form, and the dearest right of
freemen has, notwithstanding, been stricken down, and the plain
and manifest intention of more than two hundred voters frustrated.
There being, then, no other specific remedy in the case, a peremptory writ of mandamus will be awarded to L. P. Hilliard,
clerk of the Cook County Court, commanding him to issue a certificate of election to the relator, as a representative to the General
Assembly, duly elected from the sixtieth Representative District in
that county.
The foregoing opinion has been forwarded to us by the courtesy of Mr.
Fuller, the relator. And we thank him
most sincerely, on behalf of the profession and of all lovers of good order, not

partisan public functionaries, in magnifying quibbles and refusing all remedy,
by way of amendment, to the- utter disfranchisement of the freemen and of
their duly elected representative.

merely for making the decision public

We know nothing of the facts in this

at an early day, which its importance particular case, even by report. For
would seem to justify, but more espe- aught we know, the canvassers bere may
cially for bringing the question to judg- have acted in direct conflict with their
ment, and exposing the short-sighted and political prepossessions, and given the
illiberal policy of narrow-minded and certificate to one opposed to their own
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political views, when one of their own
party was elected; or both the competitors for the certificate may have
been of the same political party. We
are glad we do not know how these
facts are. We hope they are such as
not to implicate the canvassers in any
suspicion of partiality growing out of
political and partisan preferences.
But there has been so much of this
duplicity and evasion in our country in
high places, in giving certificates to
candidates in the real minority of votes,
in order to enable them thereby to defeat
the will of the actual majority, by thrusting themselves into a place to which
they were never elected, arid thus virtually and practically defeating the
rights both of the electors and the
elected, that we deem it especially
creditable, both to the candidate and to
the Court, to bring the qubstion thus
speedily to a just determination. If
'Mr. Fuller does nothing more as the
representative of the district, he will be
gratefully remembered by all lovers of
good order and decorum.
We are glad to believe that it was a

mere error of judgment with the canvassers, and that they really gave the
certificate to one opposed to their own
political preferences because they sincerely believed the informality, in the
jurats of the oath not having been signed
by the officers swearing the judges of
the election, rendered their return fatally
defective. But the cases which we have
before known have not always been of
this character. Canvassers of elections
are too apt to think that everything is
fair in politics, and that the end justifies
the means. We are therefore glad to
furnish so healthy a precedent for the
speedy correction of such errors.
There can be no doubt, we think, of
The
the soundness of the decision.
opinion of MoRToNt, J., in Strong's Case,
20 Pick. R. 484, where the whole subject
is examined in a most thorough and
exhaustive manner, fully sustains the
opinion of Judge BuEEst in the principal case, and the authorities will be
found there fully digested and collated.
See also State ex rel. Danforth vs. HunI. F. RI.
ter, 28 Verm. R. 594.

I

District Court of thze United States for the Northern District of
New York. In Admiralty.
HEMAN. NoRTON STRONG vs. A certain quantity of Wheat, being
the cargo of the schooner Convoy; FREDDRIcx T. CARRINGTON
and WILLIAM J. PRESTON, Claimants.
A carrier, finding, on his arrival at the end of his portion of the route, that an unn
usual press of business there woul'l prevent his delivery of his freight for several
days, is not thereby justified in taking the goods to another place and forwarding them from there to the consignees.
A cargo was shipped to a certain port, to be there forwarded by railroad to the
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consignees. The master of the vessel, after waiting two days and findinh tnat
his vessel could not be discharged for several days more, sailed to another port
in the same State, and discharged his cargo there: Feld, That his claim for
demurrage at the first port could not be allowed.
The custom of the lake ports, that on the failure of the consignees to provide for
the delivery of the property consigned to them. for twenty-four hours after the
report of its arrival, the master of the vessel was entitled to store the freight
subject to charges at the nearest port, would not be a reasonable custom at Port
Colborne, where there was no facility for the discharge of the cargo except at
one place, and there was some proof of the custom of the port for vessels to wait
their turn at that place.
Though the charter-party is ordinarily the controlling evidence of the contract a,
to everything clearly expressed therein, and bills of lading are often regarded
as little more than evidence of the shipping and receipt of the cargo, yet, where
the charter-party is not proved, or where it makes no provision in regard to the
consignee or mode of delivery, the bills of lading become the proper and controlling evidence, in whole or in part, of the contraot.
Freight is usually payable when it has been fully earned by the safe carriage and
right delivery of the cargo.

HALL, J.-The libel in this case was filed to compel the payment
of freight, on the cargo proceeded against, from Chicago to Port
Colborne, and thence to Buffalo; demurrage for two days' detention at Port Colborne; and sundry expenses incurred by the unlading, storage, and insurance of the cargo at Buffalo.
The bills of lading for the cargo were in the following form:-

"Chicago, August 18, 1860.
"Shipped in good order and condition, by E. G. Wolcott, on
board the schooner Convoy, of -,
whereof is master,
the following articles, marked and numbered as in the margin, to
be delivered in like good order and condition (the dangers of navigation only excepted) unto consignees as per margin, or to his or
their assigns. Freight and charges to be paid as noted below,
upon the actual and complete delivery of the said goods and freight
to said consignees or their assigns.
" In witness whereof the master of said vessel bath affirmed unto
three bills of lading all of this tenor and date, one of which being
accomplished the others to stand void.

STRONG vs. CARRINGTON ET AL.

Ac.
J. H. Burch & Co.
Care
Carrington &"reston,
Oswego, N_ Y.
via
Welland Railway from Port
Colborne to P.ort Dalhousie,
thence by sail or steam vessel to Oswego."

I

16,014 35-60 Bushels No. 1
Spring Wheat (16,014 35).
Freight to Port Colborne eight
and one-half cents per bushel.

The bill of lading copied above was signed by E. G. Wolcott as
agent of the shippers; and three other copies were signed by the
master of the Convoy. The copy of the bill of lading annexed to
the answer of the claimant is in substance the same, except that
the name of "Alex. McKirdy," as master, is inserted in the body
of the bill, that the name of "Alex. McKirdy" is signed at the
bottom, and that under that signature is the following entry:
"Freight from Port Colborne to Oswego four and one-half (4j)
cents per bushel-to be shipped from Dalhousie by steam or sail
vessel classing not below standard. Dangers of navigation exFor Welland Railway,
cepted,
WALKER, & BROTHER, Agts."
There is no proof in regard to this entry, and it does not appear
that at the time of the execution of the bills of lading, the agent or
master of the Convoy knew that any special contract had been made
for the transportation of the cargo of the Convoy over the Welland
Railway. It must therefore be assumed that their knowledge of
the final destination of the cargo, and of the mode of its transportation from Port Colborne, via the Welland Railway, to Oswego,
was wholly derived from the entries in the bill of lading, so signed
by the agent of the shipper, and similar bills of lading signed by
the master of the Convoy.
The Convoy, with her cargo on board, reached the western ter-.
minus of the Welland Railway, at Port Colborne, on Lake Erie, on
the 28th of August, 1860, between 9 and 10 o'clock in the evening.
The next morning her arrival was reported to the agents of the
Welland Railway Company, and, during that day and the next,
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the master of the schooner and the agent of her owner several times
desired the agents of the Company to discharge the vesiel, or to
fix some specific time for her discharge. The agents of the Railway Company declined to do either; stating that they could discharge vessels only in the order of their arrival, and that the
Convoy should be discharged in her turn, as soon as the other'
vessels which had arrived before her and were then awaiting their
turn could be discharged.
There was an unusual and extraordinary press of business at the
Welland Railway Company's elevator at Port Colborne, and though
vessels were discharged as rapidly as the capacity of the elevator
and railway would permit, there was at that time an accumulation
of vessels and consequent delay in their discharge. There was no
other elevator or place of storage at Port Colborne, and if the Convoy was to be discharged there she would necessarily be discharged
at the elevator of the Railway Company, or by hand labor. If discharged by hand labor, there was no means of storing the cargo
there; and it would have been exposed to injury and loss.
When the Convoy arrived there were twelve or thirteen vessels
-waiting to be discharged, and as two vessels were usually discharged
in each twenty-four hours, the Convoy, if she had been discharged
in turrf, would have been discharged on the sixth or seventh day
after her arrival-or about the 4th day of September.
There was no agent of the consignees at Port Colborne, but there
was telegraphic communication between Port Colborne and Oswego,
where the consignees resided. No instructions were asked of the
consignees and no information was sent them by' the.master of the
Convoy, who, with his vessel, remained at Port Colborne until the
afternoon of the 30th of August. He then 'sailed for Buffalo, which
was the nearest port at which storage for the wheat could be obtained. The Convoy reached Buffalo the same evening, and the
next day discharged her cargo at an elevator, her master taking a
receipt for the wheat to be delivered to his order.
The day after the cargo was discharged the libellant, as owner
of the Convoy, sent a telegram from Buffalo to the consignees at
Oswego, in the following terms:
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"Buffalo, Sept. 1, 1860.
"To Cairington & Preston:
"Obliged to store cargo Convoy in the Hatch Elevator in this
city. Shall libel cargo for freight, demurrage at Port Colborne,
and freight and charges here, unless settled immediately. Answer.
H. N. STRONG,
Owner Convoy."
On the receipt of this telegram the claimants despatched an
agent to Buffalo, who offered to pay freight to Port Colborne and
fifty or one hundred dollars in addition, but the libellant demanded
$3800 in addition to the freight provided for on the bill of lading.
No settlement was made, and on the 5th of September, 1860, the
libel in this case was filed.
On the hearing it was insisted, on behalf of the libellants, that
the Convoy was chartered for the trip from Chicago to Port Colborne, to carry the wheat which constituted her cargo; that the
bill of lading, subsequently executed, was therefore to be regarded
only as a mere receipt for the wheat; that the charter-party, and
not the bill of lading, was to be looked to as containing the contract
of affreightment between the parties; and that if there was anything in the bill of lading to prevent the recovery of freight immediately on delivery of the cargo at Port Colborne, or relieve the
owners of the cargo from the duty of receiving it there on the vessel's arrival, the bill of lading ought to be reformed so as to make
it correspond with the alleged chhrter-party.
The libellants also offered and gave (subject to the claimants'
objection) proof of the custom of the lake ports in respect to the
disposition to be made of freight when the consignee does not provide for its reception within twenty-four hours after he is informed
of its arrival. This evidence will be more particularly detailed
hereafter, and its effect considered.
The allegations of the libe.l, so far as they relate to the alleged
charter of the Convoy, are, in substance, that on the 18th day of
August, 1860, E. G. Wolcott, the agent of the owners of this cargo,
shipped, and the master and owner of the Convoy received on board
that vessel, the wheat before mentioned, which the shipper agreed
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should be carried, and which the said schooner, master and Dwner,
agreed said schooner should carry from Chicago, aforesaid, to Port
Colborne, in Canada, for the freight mentioned in a hill of lading,
which was on the said last-mentioned day duly executed and delivered
in triplicate; that it was agreed that said wheat should, pursuant to
said bill of lading and contract, be carried to ahd delivered at Port
Colborne, and that all the parties to such hill of lading and contract of affreightment (except said schooner, master and owner)
agreed that they would receive the said cargo from the said schooner on her arrival at said Port Colborne, and would then and there
relieve the said schooner therefrom, and pay the freight thereon
from Chicago to Port Colborne aforesaid, and also, that the said
schooner, master and owner did not, nor did any or either of them,
ever, in fact, agree to carry said property from said Chicago to any
other place than said Port Colborne, but did agree to carry said
wheat from said Chicago to said Port Colborne, and there deliver
the same-as the same as aforesaid was agreed to be received-to
be carried from thence as in said bill of lading mentioned. The
libel also further alleges that if the said bill of lading expressed
any other or different agreement, the same was so expressed by
mistake, and it prayed that the same-the said hill of ladingmight be reformed and altered to conform to the contract of affreightment as aforesaid made.
The only evidence to sustain the allegation that there was a contract of charter prior to and independent of the contract evidenced
by the bill of lading, is to be found in the deposition of Mr. Goodnow, the agent of the libellant, and the deposition of Mr. Wolcott,
the agent of the claimants, by and between whom the arrangements
for the carriage of the wheat were made.
The agent of the libellant says: "On or about the 18th day of
August, A. D. 1860, I, as agent of H. N. Strong, chartered the
schooner Convoy, which was then at the port of Chicago, to Mr.
E. G. Wolcott, a commission merchant on South Water street, Chicago, Illinois, to carry a cargo of wheat from Chicago to Port Colborne, in Canada, at eight and one-half cents per bushel freight.
This is the cargo now in controversy in this suit. At the time of
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making said contract, or charter, no other destination or port was
named but Port Colborne. Mr. Wolcott made out some bills of
lading for me, leaving the number of bushels of wheat blank foi
the captain to sign, as she would not be loaded until after office
hours. The captain signed the bills of lading and I took them to
the office of Mr. Wolcott, the next morning. The bills of lading
signed by the captain were three in number. The fourth bill of
lading annexed to the deposition as exhibit A, is signed by the
shipper, E. G. Wolcott, and is an exact copy of the three bills of
lading signed by the captain, with the exception of the names of
the signers. At the time the cargo was shipped and the bills of
lading were signed, there was no contract or any other understanding of whatever -kind for the transportation of the cargo to
Oswego or any other port. It was only from Chicago to Port Colborne that said contract was made for."
The agent of the claimant says: "I contracted with Mr. Goodnow for the schooner *Convoy, about the 18th of August, 1860, to
take a cargo of wheat from Chicago to Port Colborne, and I think
I made a contract with one of the Mr. Walkers to take it from
there through to Oswego. Walker was agent of the Welland
Railway Company." * * * * "My only conversation or
understanding with Mr. Goodnow was in relation to Port Colborne
only, and that was the contract made with Goodnow, from Chicago
to Port Colborne."
There is nothing in this testimony or in the other testimony in
the case to justify this court in disregarding or modifying the contract evidenced by the bill of lading. There was probably a simple
agreement that the vessel should take a cargo of wheat to Port
Colborne at 83- cents per bushel. Leaving the details of the contract to be determined by the custom and usages of shippers, masters, and vessel-owners, at Chicago, and looking to the execution
of a bill of lading as the final evidence of the terms of the contract;
or it may be that the bills of lading which were prepared with a
blank for inserting the quantity of wheat, after the cargo was put
on board and the quantity ascertained, were prepared at the time
of the first agreement as evidence of the contract agreed to by the
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agents of the parties. This testimony of the agents of the parties
should not therefore control or affect the bill of lading in this
cause.
It is true that bills of lading, signed by the master of a vessel,
under a charter-party for the voyage, are often regarded as little
more than evidence of the shipping and receipt of the cargo, and
that the charter-party is ordinarily the controlling contract as to
all the terms or provisions clearly expressed therein. Parson's
Maritime Law, 240, 241. But where a written charter-party
makes no provision in regard to the consignee or mode of delivery,
the bills of lading, which supply the omission, cannot be deemed
inoperative and invalid, because of the pre-existing charter-party.
But in this case there is no evidence of a charter-party. If the
cargo had been lost or damaged prior to its'arrival at Port Colborne, the liability of the owners of the Convoy would not have
been that of bailees to transport for hire, under a charter-party-who are only bound to the use of ordinary skill and care;-but the
greater and more stringent liability of shipowners and carriers.
The contract made by the agents of the parties was a contract for
the carriage of the wheat, not the charter of the Convoy; and the
bill of lading is, therefore, the proper and controlling evidence of
the contract.
The bill of lading shows that the Convoy was to carry the wheat
only to Port Colborne; at least this is apparent when the terms of
the bill of lading are considered in connection with the proof that
if the wheat was transported to Oswego, via the Welland Railway,
it must necessarily leave the vessel at Port Colboi'ne.. The parties
who made the contract knew this. They stipulated for the freight
to Port Colborne only; they provided for a different mode of transportation beyond ; and they knew that on the arrival of the vessel
at Port Colborne, she would, in the ordinary course, and according
to the custom of that port, be discharged at the elevator of the
Welland Railway Company. The master who signed the bill of
lading had been at that port frequently, and he knew that ihe
wheat, if discharged there and sent forward by the Welland Railway, must necessarily be delivered at that elevator, unless the
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tedious and expensive process of unloading by hand labor was
adopted.
Doubtless both parties expected and intended the vessel should
be discharged at the elevator. The shipper did not expect that
the cargo would be delayed by the slow process of discharging the
wheat by manual labor, and the shipowner did not expect to incur
the expense of manual labor for that purpose.
The Welland Railway Company was one of the carriers on a
portion of the line of transportation over which the wheat was
intended to pass (as appeared upon the face of the bill of lading
signed by the master under the inspection of the agent of the Con-voy), and both parties expected that the Railway Company would
receive and transport the cargo of the Convoy over their road.
They equally relied on the ability of the Railway Company to
receive and forward the cargo without delay; and they doubtless
were equally disappointed when it was found that in consequence
of an unusual and extraordinary press of business, at Port Colborne, several days must elapse after the arrival of the vessel before
she could be discharged.
The testimony shows that the Railway Company discharged the
vessels at Port Colborne in their turn, according to the order of
their arrival, and as rapidly as their means would allow; that the
Convoy would have been discharged in her turn, as soon as all
other vessels waiting for their discharge at the time of her arrival,
had been discharged; and that she would have been so discharged
in from six to eight days after her arrival. She remained at Port
Colborne two days and three nights, for which her owner now
claims $150 demurrage, and then, there being no means of immediately storing her cargo at Port Cilborne, she came to Buffalo and
put it in store in this city.
In determining the righis of these parties in regard to the disposition of the cargo of the Convoy, under the contract evidenced by
the bills of lading and the peculiar circumstances of this case, it is
proper here to consider the proof of the custom of the lake ports,
which it was insisted justified the course taken by the master of the
Convoy. The libellant's witnesses stated in substance, that it was
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the custom of many of the lake ports-and so far as they knew at.
all of them-for the master of a vessel to report her arrival with
freight, and to allow the consignees twenty-four hours to provide
for the delivery and receipt of the property consigned to them,
and that if the consignees were not, at the end of that time, prepared to receive the freight, the master of the vessel was, entitled
to store it, subject to charges, at the nearest point. It was not,
however, stated by these witnesses, that they could mention any
case where a vessel had left the port of destination, under such a
custom. The agent of the libellant admitted he could not do so,
and that the information he had in regard to the custom at Port
Colborne was, that it was there the custom for vessels to wait their
turn to be discharged.
It is true that in the absence of express- agreement, the duty
of the master in the delivery of freight must necessarily be determined by the custom which regulates the mode of delivery at
the port of discharge. In the absence of express contract, the
parties are presumed to have contemplated a delivery according to the established custom. And proof of a custom prevailing at most of the ports on the Great Lakes, without any
countervailing proof in respect to the other ports, might be
sufficient proof of the custom, at other ports on the same lakes,
under similar circumstances. If there was no reason for presuming the existence of a different custom, the general usages and customs of the lake ports might, in the absence of all proof in respect
to the particular port, be presumed to prevail there also; but in
this case there is some proof of a different custom 'at Port Colborne,-a custom to discharge vessels in the order of their arrival.
Port Colborne, as a commercial port, is very different from the
other lake ports, and the custom proved which is reasonable and
proper at other ports, is not likely to be adopted at that port.
Considering the peculiar character of the port and of its business,and especially the fact that it has no facilities for discharging vessels or storing their cargoes, except such as are furnished by the
elevator of the Welland Railway Company, no custom except for
vessels to wait their turn can be considered as just or reasonable ;
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and no other custon can, under the proofs in this case, be considered
as having been within the contemplation of the parties by whom the
contract of affreightment in this case was- made. The master of
the Convoy and the agent of her owner knew, as well as the shipper
and owner of the cargo, what means of discharging the vessel were
to be found at Port Colborne, and if, when the contract of affreightment was proposed, they were unwilling to take the danger of delay
consequent upon this mode of discharging this vessel, they should
have provided against it by stipulating for demurrage.
I am therefore of the opinion that the master of tho Convoy was
bound to deliver his cargo to the Welland Railway Company, and
to wait his turn for the delivery of his vessel.
But if the master of the Convoy was not bound to remain at
Port Colborne until his vessel could be discharged in its order, he
did not do 'what he ought to have done, before taking the cargo
to Buffalo and there storing it. There was telegraphic communication between Port Colborne and Oswego, where the consignees
of the wheat resided, and during the time he remained at Port
Colborne information of the delay and its cause could probably
have been sent to the consignees, and their instructions received
in return. The consignees might have offered a fair demurrage oi
have given special instructions for the disposition of the wheat;
And it was the duty of the master to endeavor to communicate
with the consignees, when it was probable that their instructions
could be readily obtained.
If, when a cargo reaches the port of destination at the residence
of the consignee (who is presumed to know that his interests will
require attention on its arrival), the shipmaster, in the absence of
any particular custom, is bound to use due diligence to find the
consignee and obtain his instructions, before he assumes to put the
cargo in store, on the ground that no other proper delivery.can be
made, it would seem to be more clearly his duty to use due diligence to obtain the consignee's instructions, in regard to the disposition of the cargo, where the difficulty in carrying out his
contract of affreightment, as originally contemplated, arises at an
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intermediate port, where the consignees were not expected to bo
present, either in person or by their agents.
The disposition of the cargo by the master requires, at all times,
the utmost caution on his part. He-should always bear in mind
that it is his duty to do all in his power to carry out, to, the extent
of his engagement, the prime object of his employment-1-the forwarding of his freight, by the route and means agreed upon, to the
place of its final destination. It is for this purpose that he has been
intrusted with it, and this purpose he is bound to endeavor to accomplish, by every reasonable and practicable effort, until he has
delivered his freight according to his contract, or such delivery has
become entirely impracticable. Even at the port of final destination and the presumed residence of the consignee, he is bound to
make every reasonable effort to deliver the cargo personally to the
consignee, or in accordance with the known and established customs of the port; which customs are presumed, in the absence of
express agreement, to be within the contemplation of the parties,
and to be, by their tacit consent, silently introduced into the contract of affreightment. If he is required to do this at the port of
final destination and the place of business of the consigilee, he cannot be required to make less effort to perform his contract and
protect the interests of the absent owner, in an unforeseen emergency, at an intermediate point, where the consignee was not expected to be present, but necessarily relied upon the acts of another
carrier having exclusive control of the means of carriage over a
portion of the line of transportation.
Good faith, the interests of
commerce, and a wise public policy equally require that the master
should do all in his power to protect the interests of freighters in
such unforeseen and extraordinary emergencies, and the master of
the Convoy should not have diverted the wheat of the claimants
from the line of transportation they had chosen, and have thereby
subjected it to unusual and unexpected charges, and exposed its
owners to a prosecution for a breach of their contract with the
Welland Railway Company, until he had atempted by telegraph to
communicate with the consignees.
It was contended on the argument that under the bill of lading
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,nthis case no freight bould be demanded until the delivery of the
wheat to the consignees at Oswego, the port of final destination,
but in the view I have taken of this case it does not become necessary to decide the question. It may possibly be doubtful what
would be the true construction of the bill of lading independent of
any custom ;-and also whether the custom for the different carriers
along the same line of transportation, to advance to each preceding
carrier all accrued freight and charges and receive the goods and
merchandise, subject to such charges, to be collected with their
own charges, on delivery to the next carrier or the consignee, has
been so long and so well established, and so often proved in Court,
as to require this Court to take judicial notice of such custom
without proof in the particular case. It is probable that this custron was understood by the parties in this case, and that they intended it should be acted upon; and it is most likely that it was
not intended or expected that the freight earned by the Convoy should
either remain unpaid, after the delivery of the wheat at Port Colborne) or be advanced by the consignees before the wheat reached
Oswego. All parties doubtless supposed it would be advanced by
the Welland Railway Company, according to the known and established custom.
Independent of the custom and looking to the bill of lading
alone, I am not prepared to say that the consignees were bound to
pay freight before the wheat arrived at Oswego. Freight is usually
payable when it has been fully earned by the safe carriage and right
delivery of the cargo, and if the bill of lading had simply provided
for the payment of the Convoy's freight on delivery, the delivery
referred to would have been the delivery by her at Port Colborne.
But such is not the provision in the bill of lading. The freight is
declared to be payable "upon the actual and complete delivery of'
said goods and freight to said consignees or their assigns "-ard it is
cl2ar that the delivery to the consignees was to be at Oswego and
not at Port Colborne.
What would have been the effect upon the rights of the parties
of an absolute refusal on the part of the Welland Railway Company to receive the wheat or advance the freight of the Convoy,
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and what would have been the duty of the master under such cir
cumstances, it is not now necessary to decide, for the Railway Company did neither, and only asked that the Convoy should wait her
turn, and be discharged in her order.
The libel is dismissed, with costs.
Tis case, for which we are indebted
to the courtesy of Judge HALL, was decided by him in the early part of last
year, and taken to the Circuit Court on
appeal. At the October session, 1862,
the opinion of that Court was delivered
briefly by Mr. Justice NELsON, affirming
the decree upon the opinion of Judge
HALL in the Court below.

named in the contract was different and
was known to all the parties.
While the general principle is abundantly well settled, that the custom of
the trade or the usage universally attaclied to the subject-matter in the place
where the contract is made, may be used
as evidence to explain the ambiguities
or supply the omissions of defective contracts (Addison on Cont. 851; 1 Greenl.
Evid. 292), and though the decisions
draw a clear line of distinction between
a custom modifying general contracts,
which must be long-continued, even from
time immemorial, and a usage of trade
which may be of recent origin (Barton
v. McKelway, 2 Zabr. 165; Knowles r.
Dow, 2 Foster 387; Townsend v. Whitby,
5 Harrington 55), yet it is important to
bear in mind that even in the case of
mercantile usage this rule was meant for
a general, uniform, no.torious, and reasonable course of trade in long-established
commercial communities, and should be
applied with great caution to avoid fettering the commerce of our growing
towns by hasty judicial recognition of
their early crude and temporary customs. See Harper v. Pound, 10 Ind. R.
32; Wall v. East River Insurance Cc., 3
Duer 273; and the remarks of Judge

The case was of importance, not only
as it affected the right of the shipmaster
to change the port of delivery and forward his freight to the consignees by a
route different from tlat laid down in
his contract, but also as it involved, to
some extent, the judicial recognition of
customs claimed to be established at the
lake ports.
The particular custom alleged was for
the master of a vessel to report her arrival and allow the consignees twentyfour hours to provide for the delivery
and receipt of the cargo, and in case
they failed to do so in that time, the
master to be entitled to store the
freight, subject to charges, at the nearest
point.
The reasonable character of such a
custom is discussed, though not expressly decided up-n, the proof having failed
to come up to the point claimed by the
libellant, and there being some evidence STORY in the case of The Schooner
that the custom of the particular port lReeside, 2 Sumner 57.
J. T. M.
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Superior Court of New York.
JOHN R. LEWIS vs. MELAYCTHON BURR,

assignee of JAMES

SHARP.

Where a person, having at the time a lease for an. unexpired term, assigns all his
property, in trust for the benefit of his creditors, and the assignment does not
disclose, and the assignee is ignorant at the time he.accepts of the assignment,
that the assignor owns such a lease, the assignee will not become liable for
subsequently accruing rent, if he does not enter into the possession of the
demised premises, as such assignee, or do any act which can be regarded as an
election to accept of the term.
Where the assignment is made on the 28th of January, and the assignee merely
euters, to take an inventory of and remove assigned property being on the
demised premises, and completes the inventory and removes the property on
the 31st, staying no longer than is necessary for that purpose; and never
further or otherwise occupies the demised premises, he does not, thereby,
become liable for the rent falling due February 1st, or subsequently.
Whether a voluntary assignee of property, in trust for the benefit of creditors,
stands in the same position as an assignee in bankruptcy, in respect to a lease
owned by the assignor at the time of the assignment, discussed by BOSWORTH,
Cl. J.

This action was submitted to the Court at general term, in
November 1860, for its judgment, upon a case containing the facts
upon which the controversy depends, agreed upon by the parties
pursuant to section 372 [325], of the New York Code. The plaintiff, as assignee of one Ossian L. Hatch, claims to recover a
quarter's rent of premises demised by Hatch to one James Sharp.
Sharp, on the 28th of January, 1860, being insolvent, assigned all
his property to the defendant, in trust for the benefit of the credi.
tors of Sharp: the rent in question fell due Febuary 1st, 1860.
The question is, whether the defendant, on the facts of the case
(and which are stated in the opinion of BosW oTH, Ch. J.), is
liable for such rent.
3fartit

.

Smiths, for plaintiff.

Hf. J. Whitehead, for defendant.
By the Court, BOSWORTH, Ch. J.
James Sharp, on the 28th of January, 1860, was the lessee of
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one Ossian L. Hatch, and as such lessee, held a lease of a part of
the store and basement of No. 26 Church street, in the city of New
York, at an annual rent of $1500, payable quarterly, which lease,
by its terms, was for four years and nine months from May 1st, 1859.
On the 28th of January, 1860, Sharp, by a written assignment,
assigned all his property, real and personal, to the defendant, in
trust for the benefit of the creditors of Sharp. The assignment
did not specify the lease as part of the property assigned.
The assignment was executed by the defendant, and it recites
that he "shall, and does, hereby .and hereunder, take possession
of all and singular" the property thereby assigned. When the
assignment was executed, there was a stock of goods on the
demised premises belonging to the assignor.
It is agreed by the parties, as facts in the case, that on said
28th of January, " the defendant as such assignee, entered the
demised premises, took possession of the stock embraced in said
assignment, took an inventory thereof; and the assignor Sharp,
with the approval of the defendant, exhibited the -entire stock for
sale, on the demised premises, to two persons. The inventory was
completed on the 30th. The defendant on that day, at the auction
room of several auctioneers, negotiated for the removal and sale
by auction of said stock of goods, and on the 31st of January, he
removed all of said stock of goods from said premises, and the
defendant has not since that time, nor otherwise than as above
stated, actually occupied the same."
",That the time taken to make said inventory, was reasonable
and necessary.
",The rent reserved in said lease, is greater than the value of
the use and occupation of the demised premises.
"The defendant has not in any manner assigned or disposed
of his right, title, and interest (if any he ever acquired) in the
lease."
Is the defendant, upon these facts, liable for the quarter's rent,
$375, falling due February 1st, 1860? That rent has not been
paid, and the plaintiff, as assignee of the lessor's claim for it, seeks
to recover it from the defendant.
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We regard it as settled, that an assignee in bankruptcy does
not, by the mere force of the assignment and his acceptance of it,
become the assignee of an unexpired term of a lease, -hich the
bankrupt may own when the assignment is made, in such sense,
that he cannot decline to accept the term, and avoid incurring
liability, as assignee, for subsequently accruing rent. The assignee
may decline to accept of the term, and in that case will not be
liable as an assignee of the lease. But if he enter into -the possession of the demised premises, and occupy them as such assignee,
he will be liable for rent accruing during such occupation. He
will not become liable by merely entering into the demised premises, for the purpose of taking possession of other property of the
bankrupt and removing it. Martin vs. Black, 9 Paige 644. How
vs. .Kennett, 3 Ad. & Ellis 659. Hanson vs. Stevenson, 1 Barn. &
Ad. 304. Copeland vs. Steph~ens, Id. 594.
If a voluntary assignee of property, in trust for the benefit of
the creditors of the assignor, stands in the same position; then
the only question will be, whether the defendant has done any
acts, signifying his assent or election to accept of the term.
There is no doubt, that, if he accepts of the term as assignee,
he will be liable for rent accruing whilst he holds the estate as
assignee. Patten vs. Deshon, 1 Gray 329.
So a mere equitable assignee of a lease, who, as such, has entered
into ppssession and occupied the demised premises, is liable for the
rent accruing during such occupancy. Jenkins vs. Portman,
1 Keen 435. S. C., 15 Eng. Oh. R. 455, note 2. Close vs. Wilberforce, 1 Beavan 113.
But may a voluntary assignee accept of the general assignment
made by the assignor, and reject the term ? In the present case,
it does not appear that the assignee when he accepted of the
assignment, knew that his assignor owned the lease; and the
question is to be considered, in view of this, as one of the facts in
the case.
In Cartervs. Ifarne, 4 Oarr. & P. 191, Lord TENTEI)DEN, C. J.,
held and charged the jury, that a voluntary assignee of property,
in trust for the benefit of creditors, stood in the same position
as an assignee in bankruptcy. This ruling is adverted to by
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LITTLEDALE and PATTESON, Js., in their opinions in How vs.
Kennett, suprd. But it can hardly be said, that either of them
expressed the opinion that it was accurate.
In Pratt vs. Levan
Snyder, 1 Miles 358, it was held, that the
voluntary assignee might reject the term, and that the same rules
applied to him as to an assignee in bankruptcy. In that case,
however, the lease was not assignable except by the written consent of the lessor, and that consent he never gave. See Morri8
vs. Parker et al., 1 Ashmead 187. The case of Carter vs. Hammett, 12 Barb. S. C. R. 253, favors the same view. The N. Y.
Common Pleas in JTourneay vs. Brackley, I Hilton 447, determine
the precise point, in favor of the voluntary assignee. No case
has been cited, which decides to the contrary.
The cases in this Court, in which the voluntary assignee has
been held liable, are not in conflict with the rule for which the
defendant contends.
In Young vs. Peyser, 3 Bos. 308, the assignee entered into the
demised premises, and took possession thereof, by virtue of the
assignment, and occupied the premises until he surrendered them
and the lease to the plaintiff, who accepted them. The assignee
was held liable for the rent which fell due, during such occupation.
The same rule was applied in Astor vs. Lent, 6 Bosw. 612.
The case of Muir vs. Glinsman (argued at the January and
decided at the February General Term of this Court 1856), and
commented on in Journeay vs. Braekley, supra,1 Hilton 455-457,
is not in conflict with the decisions in the latter case, or with that
made in Pratt vs. Levan, sura.
uir vs. Glinsman did not seek to charge the assignee personally, and the judgment, pronounced at special term, directed that
the quarter's rent which fell due November 1st, 1854, should be
paid by the assignee out of the proceeds of the assigned property
in his hands; the complaint alleging, and the answer not denying,
that Glinsman had in his hands proceeds of the assigned property
sufficient to pay such rent. Muir, on the 29th of April, 1854,
leased to one James Grundy the second and third floors of the
premises, No. 442 Broadway, for two years, from the 1st of May
then next, at $1950 per annum, payable quarterly. In Septem-
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ber 1854, Grundy, being in the occupation of the demised premises, and having become insolvent, assigned all his property (in
trust for the benefit of creditors) to Glinsman. The latter immediately took actual possession of the premises, and of the assigned
property therein ; put a clerk in possession, who continued therein,
making sales therein, until after the 1st of Ndvember,1854, when the
quarter's rent, which that action was brought to recover, became
due. The assigned property (including the lease) was mortgaged
by a chattel mortgage made prior to the assignment, and in force
when it was made. In the language of that case, "cthere was
considerable of the assigned property left, after satisfying the
mortgage," and "part of the goods were sent from the store in
Broadway to a store in Nassau street, and were returned after the
mortgage was satisfied." The goods so returned, were sold on the
demised premises.
The evidence justified the conclusions that the assignee entered
the demised premises with intent to occupy them, and to occupy
them as assignee, by virtue of the assignment, and did so occupy
them; and the Court thought the assignee had no ground of complaint in the fact that he was ordered to pay that quarter's rent
out of the moneys in his hands, realized from the assigned estate,
instead of paying it out of his own funds. See Astor vs. L'Anzoreuz, 4 Sand. S. 0. 524; s. c., 4 Seld. 107; Childs vs. Clark, 3
Barb. Ch. R. 52; Calvert vs. Bradley, 18 How. U. S. R. 680.
If we are at liberty to follow the decisions made in Pratt vs. Levan, and Journeay vs. Brackley, suprd, there is nothing in the
plaintiff's equities which should disincline us to do so. See opinion
of DENIMAN, C. J., in How vs. Kennett, suprd.
Voluntary assignees of property in trust for the benefit of creditors, administer large estates ; and their appointment is a matter
of almost daily occurrence : they are, by existing laws, placed on
the same footing, in respect tp the costs of suits brought by and
against them, as executors and administrators. Code, § 817.
They may maintain actions for the benefit of creditors, to reach
property which their assignor had disposed of, with intent to defraud. Laws of 1858, p. 506, ch. 314.
VOL. XI.-20
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The same considerations of public policy which permit an assignee
in bankruptcy, a receiver, or executor, to reject a term which
would be a charge instead of a benefit to the estate he is appointed
to administer, would seem to favour its application to a voluntary
assignee for the benefit of creditors.
The recent legislation in this State, already referred to, seems
to have its origin in the same views.
We think, therefore, that the defendant's liability in this case
depends upon the question,- whether he entered under such circumstances as manifest his assent to accept the term.
The case concedes that the rent reserved is more than the value
of the use of the demised 'premises. It was, therefore, the duty
of the assignee to waive the term, if he had the right to do so.
He was not in possession when the rent in question accrued:
he has not paid any rent to the plaintiff. The assignment does
not import that the assignor had any such property as the lease in
qudstion, nor does.it dppear that the assignor knew that he had.
Had it appeared that the assignee knew, when he accepted of the
assignment, that the assignee owned this unexpired term, what
effect should be given to that fact, it is unnecessary now to consider.
The case does not state that the assignee took possession of the
demised premises.
It states that he entered them, and "ctook possession of the
stock," &c. And as it also states that he did not occupy the premises, otherwise than to make an inventory of the goods and remove them, and stayed no longer than was'necessary for that
purpose-all having been concluded on the third day after the
assignment was executed-we are of the opinion, upon the facts
as the parties have stated them, that his entry was solely for the
purpose of possessing himself of the stock, and without any intent
to accept of the term.
That he did nothing which could have led the plaintiff to suppose that he entered upon the premises with a view to take posses
sion of them as assignee, even if the plaintiff knew, before the
goods had been removed, that any assignment had been made.
These views entitle the defendant to judgment.
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Where the public acquire a right of way over a race previously dug by the owner
of the land, the burden of building and maintaining such a bridge as is neces-

sary for the highway, rests upon the public.
On the other hand, where the owner of the land, for his own purposes, digs a race
across an existing highway, he is bound to build and keep in repair such bridge
as is necessary for the highway.
His obligation is proportioned to the public right at the time. If the way be only
a footway, a bridge to accommodate foot-passengers is all he is required to
build or maintain. If the public subsequently acquire greater rights, his obligation is not increased.
Therefore, in a case where a bridge built by defendants' vendor had been carried
away and a new one built wider and higher, to correspond with a new road laid
out by order of Court on the site of the old one, it was held, that defendants
were not liable for repairs to this new bridge.

J., delivered the opinion of the Court.
If the public acquire a right of way over a race previously dug
by the owner of*the land through which it passes, the burden of
building and maintaining such a bridge as is necessary for the
highway, rests upon the public. On the other hand, it is equally
clear, that, if the owner of a mill make a channel to it across a
highway already in existence, and build a bridge over the channel
which is used as a public bridge, he shall be bound to repair.
This is laid down in 1 Rolle's Ab. 368, title Bridges, pl. 2, and it
has been ever since recognised as law. Perley vs. Chandler, 6
Mass. 454. Dygert vs. Schenk, 23 Wendell 446. Woodring vs.
Forks Township, 4 Casey 355. The reason given is, that the
bridge is erected for the private benefit of the owner of th6 mill.
To this might be added, that it is made necessary by his interference with the way in which the public had acquired a right.
Though he may dig and maintain a race through a highway, the
fee simple of which belongs to. him, he cannot do it at the expense
of the rights of the public. He must preserve the highway, without any diminution of the right to its enjoyment which the public
had obtained before ; and hence, his obligation to build and maintain a bridge, such as shall keep the way in substance as good as
STRONG,
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it was before he dug his race. His obligation is proportioned to
the public right. If the way be only a footway, a bridge to ziccommodate foot-passengers is all that he is required to build or maintain. If the public subsequently acquire greater rights his obligation is not increased, for with those enlarged rights he has not
interfered.
We understand the Court below to have instructed the jury in
accordance with these principles. When the race was dug, the
public had acquired rights to a way which had been opened, and
upon which repairs had been made by the supervisors of the township. Then it became the duty of the landowner, on excavating
the race across the way, to build a bridge over the race adequate
for the road, as it was then open. Beyond the road, as open, the
public had no right of way. Such a bridge was constructed, so
far as appeared, satisfactorily to the public authorities.- Some
years afterwards, by order of the Court of Quarter Sessions, a new
road was laid out and opened partially on the site of the old road,
crossing the race, but of the width of thirty-three feet, while the
width of the old road at the crossing was but twenty feet. For a
time travelling on the new road was over the bridge as it had been,
but the bridge having been carried away, a new one was erected,
wider and higher than the former, to accommodate the road as it
had been located by order of the Court. The qfiestion raised oit
the trial was, whether the defendants, who succeeded the owners at
the 'time the race was dug, are liable for repairs to this second
bridge. Upon this subject the charge to the jury must be considered as a whole. We may not extract a single sentence and
overlook its connection and qualification. The substance of thc
'instruction given to the jury was, that there was nothing in the
single fact that a new road had been laid out, that relieved the
defendants from their obligation to maintain the bridge ; that if
the new road was substantially the same as the road which was
there when the race was cut, they were bound to keep the bridge
in repair. On the other hand, they were instructed, that if the
new road differed materially from the old one at the race crossing;
if it was not on the same ground, or was widened, and, in conse-
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quence of the change, a different bridge was required to accommodate the new and different right of the public, the defendants were
not bound to construct such a bridge or keep it in repair. The
part of the charge singled out for exception, is but a substantial
repetition of the instruction. It is not a just view of it, which
sees any such doctrine as the plaintiff in error urges is found in it.
The jury could not have understood it to mean, that, if the new
bridge would accommodate more passengers than the old one,
the defendants were not liable. The language of the Court
referred to different rights of the public, not to a difference in the
number of travellers along the highway. With such new rights,
if any there were, the defendants had never interfered, and therefore, repairs of a bridge erected in pursuance of these rights could
not be demanded of them. This part of the charge was at least as
favorable to the plaintiffs as they had a right to demand.
The second assignment of error is, that the Court erred 'in
charging the jury, that the plaintiffs could not recover for money
expended in repairing the footway alongside of the county bridge,
over French creek. The assignment, we think, is well founded.
The footway was erected by the vendor of the defendants, not as
the price paid for a franchise given, but as a substitute for a portion of the public right appropriated to themselves. By the Act
of Assembly, they were allowed to occupy the bridge over French
creek with railroad for their private use; but they were required
by the same Act, to construct a convenient and substantial footway
over the creek, to be attached to the bridge on the west side, as
soon as their railroad should be laid on the bridge. The railroad
was constructed over the bridge as authorized by the Act, and as
required, the footway was built. With this the court was of opinion the obligation of the defendants was satisfied. It is true, the
language of the Act is, that the footway shall be constructed as
soon as the railway is laid over the bridge. It does not in words
say anything of repairs, but the Act is to be construed according
to its intention. That intention, it is true, is to be gathered from
its words, but not from any single word. We must ascertain its
spirit and meaning from all the language employed. Now the
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requirement of a footway contemporaneously with the occupatioi.
of the bridge by a'railway, makes it clear, that the Legislature did
not intend to diminish the rights of the public or the convenience
of the foot-passengers. It was evident that the use of a railway
over the bridge would obstruct and endanger passage on foot. It
was most just, that while the grantees of the privilege continued
to use the bridge for such a way and for their private advantage,
they should provide other means of passage equally convenient and
lasting, with those which the public would have enjoyed had it not
been for their interference. It is a fair presumption, that the
Legislature never intended to give away public rights or to impose
x burden upon any local community without compensation. Yet,
if the construction of the Act contended for by the defendants is
correct, a burden has been imposed on the plaintiffs-namely, the
maintenance of the foot-bridge, solely for the private advantage
of those who are using the railway. For their benefit the footway
was erected, and *for their benefit it is maintained. There is, then,
the same reason for requiring them to repair, that there was for
requiring them to erect. We think, therefore, the Act of Assembly imposed a continuing obligation to provide the designated
substitute, for the diminished facility and safety of passage across
the bridge, so long as the public right shall thus be abridged.
And such has been the construction given to similar language in
other legislative Acts. Thus, in Rex vs. The Inhabitants of the
County of Kent, 13 East 220, it was ruled, that a company, which
by Act of Parliament had been empowered to make a river navigable and to take tolls, "and to amend or alter such bridges or
highways as might hinder the passage or navigation, leaving them
or others as convenient in their room," was bound to repair a
bridge which, under tbe Act, they had built forty years previously
to the indictment. Lord ELLENBOROUGH declared it to be a continuing condition, and all the judges held, that the word " leaving"
imported both building and continued maintenance, because the
alteration in the old highway was made for the purposes of the
company. The doctrine of Rex vs. The Inhabitants of Lindsay,
14 East 317, seems to be, that when the acts of a grantee of a

